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Cut?”: Track-laying, Modernization, and People’s 
Livelihood in Republican Beijing 
July 13, 2011 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | Permalink 
By Jared Hall 
In a post yesterday at this site, I discussed recent cleavages between the rapidly expanding 
Beijing Subway and segments of the public the system is meant to serve. In that post, I 
pointed to residents who voiced concerns about property seizures, safety lapses, and 
excessive noise from nearby tracks. When the subway corporation attempted to shut out 
community objections related to each of these issues, residents then utilized a common 
repertoire of protest that included petitions, visits to government offices, and public 
demonstrations. 
While our understanding of each of these incidents must to a certain extent be conditioned by 
the contingencies particular to their contemporary moment, significant parallels with previous 
eras beg closer attention. Long before the subway—opened to the public only in 1984—earlier 
generations of track-bound infrastructure provoked similar debates among Beijing residents. 
In the two decades after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, railways and streetcars were 
central to elite modernizing visions for Beijing. It was in the first heady years of the post-
revolutionary order that Sun Yat-sen, acting as director for national railway planning, drew up 
plans for a nationwide network connecting Beijing to every provincial capital in China. His total 
vision, still unrealized to this day, was designed to serve as the backbone of a national 
economic development program that would transform the country. Within the capital, political 
and commercial elites together with leading intellectuals cheered on streetcar development as 
a revolution in urban mobility. In a 1919 manifesto, Li Dazhao, the Beijing University librarian 
and future co-founder of the Communist Party, called on the government to “build a 
municipally managed streetcar system at once.” 
Just as today, undertaking such an ambitious task of infrastructure development was costly. 
In financial terms, the construction demands easily exceeded the capacity of the weakened 
post-Qing state. Instead of a publicly-run system as Li Dazhao had envisaged, the city’s 
streetcar development was entrusted to a French banking conglomerate that then issued stock 
to wealthy non-resident investors. Since the 1880s, railway development had proceeded along 
much the same path, with new infrastructure predominantly financed and controlled by 
foreigners. Ironically, it was resistance to precisely this type of foreign encroachment that 
animated the rights-recovery movement that had helped give the ailing dynasty a final shove 
in 1911. 
Even so, there was more reason than patriotism alone to oppose external control over 
transportation networks. Streetcar and railway routes, like subways in present-day Beijing, 
posed social challenges that outside investors had little incentive to address. Rickshaw 
pullers, as David Strand has vividly detailed, were one group that had good reason to fear the 
arrival of new transportation technology. They worried that fast, convenient trolleys would 
render their services redundant. Local merchants also raised alarm once construction was 
underway, objecting to the disruption caused by debris that clogged roadways and the partial 
demolition of shop fronts to make way for the tracks. The concerns of both groups remained 
unacknowledged until the Chamber of Commerce pressed its case with a boycott of shop taxes 
and police license fees. 
In the freewheeling political atmosphere of Republican Beijing, protest tactics only escalated 
from there. On the day the streetcar service was slated to launch in December 1924, rickshaw 
men boldly threatened to block the tracks by laying down en masse. Tragedy was avoided only 
after the protest were called off, though the incident might be seen as an ominous prelude to 
streetcar-smashing riots that broke out just four years later. While it is true such tactics point 
to a wide gap between the protest strategies of the 1920s and today, the underlying pattern 
of closed, unaccountable planning process being met with grassroots opposition persists. 
Moreover, the discourse of “people’s livelihood” (民生) that pervaded popular discussion during 
the period has remained a viable discursive claim down through to the present. Originating 
from the vocabulary of Confucian moral economy, the term was elevated to the heights of 
Republican political discourse as one of Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles (三民主 ), only 
to be reappropriated once again by the Communists, this time with a distinct Marxist 
inflection. 
The same pattern of elite planning being met with popular resistance and similar rhetorical 
debates over the political content of people’s livelihood also appear centrally in Madeleine 
Dong’s account of another incident from the period, the removal of the Beijing city walls 
around Xuanwu Gate (宣武 ). The project, which began in December 1928 after having been 
mired in a decade of delay, aimed to alleviate traffic congestion by straightening a stretch of 
railway and widening the road that passed through the gate. Unlike streetcar development, 
which was handled solely by a corporation autonomous from public control, responsibility for 
the project was shared jointly by the Municipal Council and the Beijing-Hankou Railway, 
though the latter’s role was limited to financial support. Without private interests clouding the 
planning process, the path should have been cleared for an inclusive approach. Still, area 
residents and shopkeepers remained shut out by bureaucrats driven by a technocratic vision 
of public interest. 
Neighborhood shopkeepers, while conceding the broader benefit of increased mobility, 
nevertheless wanted their interests considered when weighing public welfare. One merchant 
framed the issue in exactly these terms in his petition to the Department of Public Works: 
“How can we hope to make a living if our roots are cut? It is necessary to make transportation 
convenient, but at the same time, attention should also be paid to people’s livelihood.” When 
initial pleas like this were shrugged off, members of the community worked together to lobby 
the mayor. When they found information was blocked and compensation denied, they filed still 
more petitions and refused relocation. 
Like more recent struggles between Beijing’s municipal government and city residents, the 
former retained an advantage over the latter by controlling information about the project and 
claiming a monopoly over the right to define the public interest. However, some residents 
were able to expose political vulnerabilities within the bureaucracy and did ultimately receive 
compensation for property destroyed during construction. Undoubtedly, certain strategies from 
the Republican era are no longer possible for present-day Beijingers (the last hope for a wide-
scale cross-class alliance, to take one example, collapsed in the summer of 1989). Yet, this 
process of contestation, joined with the popular ability to force the debate over people’s 
livelihood into a more widely-accessible public realm, represent important continuities with the 
present battles over subway and other transportation expansion projects in contemporary 
Beijing. 
Jared Hall lives in Beijing, where he teaches Chinese and World History at the International 
Division of Peking University’s Affiliated High School. He can be found online on Twitter and on 
his blog, Beijing Time Machine. 
 	
